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INTRODUCTION
When analysing the many complex issues thrown up by
the ongoing corporate governance debate our focus tends
to settle on well-intentioned prescriptions for the orderly
running of a solvent concern, particularly a listed company.
But when reviewing the extant body of scholarship on
corporate governance we should recognise the fact the
overwhelming majority of companies are not listed, so they
fall outside the scope of many “soft law” codes. We also
note that many companies fail to live up to these
expectations and ultimately fail, though not necessarily
because of any such corporate governance lapses
themselves but rather because of the fundamental
economics underpinning the business model.
Where business failure occurs, it is important that the
incumbent directors do not try to informally wind down
the business; that falls outside their remit – see Re Ipcon
Fashions Ltd (1989) 5 BCC 733. Rather, a new management
regime should then be installed in the form of an
independent and professionally qualified insolvency
practitioner, whose function as office holder will be either
to achieve rehabilitation or (more usually) to perform an
efficient burial in accordance with the norms of
distributional justice. This office holder in that capacity as
successor-manager will also have a responsibility to ensure
that the previous management has lived up to required
standards established for company directors. Scrutiny of
managerial conduct in the twilight zone is essential and
powers of investigation may have to be deployed, followed
up by litigation if required. But it must never be forgotten
that many comparable governance standards now also
apply to the actions of insolvency office holders themselves
and therefore it is universally accepted that effective
mechanisms should exist to promote adherence to these
standards. The purpose of this short article is to highlight
in this context of the discharge of stewardship
responsibilities by insolvency office holders a number of
governance-related issues worthy of further exploration.
DEFINITIONAL AND STATUS ISSUES
One initial problem confronting any researcher into the
regulation of insolvency practitioners is that they operate
under various legal guises and this has the potential to sow
the seeds of confusion. Although the basic term
“insolvency practitioner” is well established in the
legislative matrix (see Insolvency Act 1986 s 388) we also
have to grapple with the variable category of “office
holders” (Insolvency Act 1986 ss 230 et seq), “officers of
the court” (a common law idea the scope of which is not
entirely clear) and now “appointees” (Practice Direction:
Insolvency Proceedings [2012] BCC 265). Surely, there must
be scope for some rationalisation of legal designation here.
There are other status issues to get to grips with.
Insolvency practitioners are invariably installed as agents of
the company (for confirmation of this with regard to
administrative receivers and administrators see for example
Insolvency Act 1986 s 44(1)(a) and Sched B1 para 69
respectively). Significant modern authorities confirming
this position in the case of receivers include Mills v Birchall
[2008] EWCA Civ 385, [2008] BCC 471 and Edenwest Ltd
v CMS Cameron McKenna [2012] EWHC 1258 (Ch), where
Hildyard J undertook (at paras [60] to [72]) a valuable
analysis of the implications of this agency. This agency
nexus results in office holders assuming a status as
fiduciaries. A number of consequences and duties naturally
flow from this position of peculiar responsibility. For
instance, there is an obligation not to permit a conflict of
interest, or to acquire an inappropriate profit from one’s
position as a steward. These particular obligations are
reflected both by the Insolvency Act 1986 and by the
Insolvency Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1925) – for liquidators
see in this context Insolvency Rule 4.149. There is also a
duty imposed on insolvency practitioners not to
compromise their professional independence by becoming
too close to any particular stakeholder. Compliance with
this latter requirement can be challenging as the realities
are that certain insolvency practitioners will often have a
close and repeat relationship with a particular stakeholder,
such as a secured creditor.
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By way of clarification we observe that insolvency office
holders, rather like directors, do not generally occupy a
position as a trustee, though their obligations may often be
comparable. Occasionally, a trustee status arises in respect
of an insolvency practitioner; for example, the supervisor of
a company voluntary arrangement will hold funds collected
during the CVA as trustee for participating creditors.
APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE
Access to the stewardship of a company via taking up
office as an insolvency practitioner is tightly controlled in
the UK. It is only available to individuals (as opposed to
corporate bodies) and since 1985 such individuals must be
professionally qualified/ regulated. A bond must also be
lodged as a form of financial security. These are important
foundations recommended by the Cork Committee on
Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982) and are
designed to promote good stewardship. They compare
favourably with the relatively lax rules operating on the
qualification to be a company director and on the ability to
access limited liability at minimal financial cost.
There have been a number of recent authorities that
throw light on the regulatory environment related to
appointment of insolvency office holder. Sometimes two
equally worthy insolvency practitioners are nominated as
office holders by different stakeholders. How to choose
between them? This was the predicament faced by Morgan
J in Healthcare Management Services Ltd v Caremark Properties
[2012] EWHC 1693 (Ch) where an application had been
made to the court by an unsecured creditor for the
appointment of an administrator. The applicant had a
nominee in mind for the post of administrator as did
another unsecured creditor. The pragmatic solution adopted
by Morgan J was to appoint the nominee of the creditor who
was owed the larger debt. This tiebreaker methodology was
possible as both nominees were equally acceptable.
The issue of directors appointing administrators out of
court pursuant to paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 of the
Insolvency Act 1986, a scenario that was intended to
reduce the role of the court, has ironically generated much
litigation in the wake of the ruling of Chancellor Sir
Andrew Morritt in Minmar [2011] EWHC 1159 (Ch),
[2011] BCC 485. Although the decision in that case was
clearly merited on the facts, for many judges the suggestion
that the appointment of the administrator would be
deemed invalid because the directors had failed to notify
the company itself seemed too pernickety, and in a number
of first instance authorities they lined up to voice their
opposition. Other judges supported strict adherence to the
formal requirements. Constructive solutions to this
procedural irregularity that avoided the need to invalidate
the administration were also put forward with the focus of
attention being upon retrospective judicial validation
relying on the precedent of Re G-Tech Construction Ltd
[2007] BPIR 1275, or exploitation of the untapped
potential of para 104 of Sched B1.
In Re BXL Services [2012] EWHC 197 (Ch), [2012]
BCC 657 HHJ Purle QC, when reviewing the extant
jurisprudence, opined that in the wake of the large number
of first instance authorities on the subject the law was now
settled in favour of a more flexible approach. One can only
hope that this prediction remains the case, and certainly
there has been a marked decrease in reported litigation on
this point in the past six months. Moving away from the
narrow “paragraph 22” issue there is the wider question of
the extent to which procedural irregularities in the
appointment of an office holder can be whitewashed. We
note here the provision found in Insolvency Rule 7.55
which enables the court to forgive procedural irregularity
in the context of insolvency proceedings and the differing
outcomes in the courts as reflected in administration cases
such Re Euromaster Ltd [2012] EWHC 2356 (Ch), [2012]
BCC 754 (a decision of Norris J) and Re Eco Link Resources
[2012] BCC 751 (per HHJ David Cooke). The former
involved a minor lapse in the appointment of an
administrator one day after the notice of intention to
appoint had expired, whereas the latter case was
concerned with failure to give notice to a prior
chargeholder. It is therefore a matter of degree as to
whether Insolvency Rule 7.55 will come into play. As
always, practitioners should not place their reliance upon a
benign judicial view of any procedural shortcoming.
THE BASIC ROLE OF THE INSOLVENCY
OFFICE HOLDER
This will, of course, vary depending upon the precise
insolvency regime involved. If we take the paradigm case of
liquidation, clearly the central function is to collect, realise
and distribute the assets (Insolvency Act 1986 s 143(1)).
There is an obligation under section 144 to take custody of
the company’s assets. But it is often overlooked that
insolvency practitioners are there to protect the public
interest in terms of the way in which limited liability
operates – for example by reporting the names of directors
who appear to be unfit to the authorities as they are obliged
to do by section 7(3) of the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986. Powers of investigation
conferred on office holders can quite properly be utilised
with that purpose in mind. A perusal of the judgment of
Lord Millett in Official Receiver v Wadge, Rapps and Hunt
[2003] UKHL 49, [2004] 1 AC 158 will serve to confirm
that wider perspective.
In other cases, the role of the insolvency office holder
may focus upon rescue and actions taken should reflect
that goal. For the most parts the courts have been
supportive of the pro-rescue philosophy embraced by
successive governments and it is therefore easy to
understand why the odd ruling that goes against the flow
may generate a disproportionate outcry.
The basic task of insolvency office holders these days
often involves confronting cross border insolvency
complications as assets and debts may be located in several 3
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jurisdictions. Fortunately, there have been positive reforms
made in the law via the EC Regulation on Insolvency
Proceedings (1346/2000) and the Cross Border Insolvency
Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030) (which seek to
implement the UNCITRAL Cross Border Model
Insolvency Law). These developments in cross border
cooperation undoubtedly have made life easier for UK
insolvency practitioners (and, incidentally, have generated
more work via “imported” insolvency cases). But they have
not been the only beneficiaries of this outbreak of comity.
In Re Chesterfield United Inc [2012] EWHC 244 (Ch),
[2012] BCC 786 Newey J has confirmed that on an
application under Art 21 of Cross-Border Insolvency
Regulations 2006 the use of section 236 investigation
powers under the Insolvency Act 1986 can be offered to
foreign insolvency office holders. This ruling is consistent
with the pro comity attitudes applied by the English courts
when dealing with requests under section 426 of the
Insolvency Act 1986 for insolvency assistance from foreign
courts based in designated jurisdictions.
Generally speaking, the common law has over the past
decade also moved in a favourable direction in terms of
facilitating insolvency practice in cross border cases,
though that development has been thrown into question in
view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Rubin v
Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2012] 3 WLR 1019. It
remains to be seen whether this particular precedent is but
a temporary setback, or an indicator of future judicial
attitudes. Whatever, the relative importance of the
legislative pro comity mechanisms has been reinforced by
this judgment.
THE POWERS AND RIGHTS OF
INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS
The reforms enacted in the Insolvency Act 1986 have
certainly improved the armoury of the insolvency
practitioner, both with regard to powers of investigation
and follow up action (whether it take the form of a
recovery claim against a company officer or an application
to set aside an improper transaction). But there is scope
for improvement, particularly with regard to
administrators whose role has expanded considerably since
the Enterprise Act 2002 took effect in September 2003.
The gap between administrators and liquidators has
narrowed in terms of the role they play. Many
administrations are in effect disguised liquidations and
administrators enjoy statutory powers of distribution. So,
why should administrators not be given the power to bring
wrongful trading claims pursuant to section 214 of the
Insolvency Act 1986? What now is the logic in denying
administrators an explicit power to disclaim onerous assets
(see Insolvency Act 1986 s 178)? These inconsistencies are
not isolated – witness the curious differential in the relative
powers of distribution of liquidators and administrators
(and CVA supervisors), as commented upon by Newey J in
Re TXU Europe Group pc [2011] EWHC 2072 (Ch), [2012]
BCC 363 at para [20]. There is a need for more joined up
thinking in the future when the law is reviewed.
One provision which is expressly applicable to
administrations is section 234 of the Act, which enables
office holders to apply to the court to recover company
property and books held by third parties. This facility was
considered by Sir Andrew Morritt in Re La Senza SA
(Uniserve v Croxen) [2012] EWHC 1190 (Ch). As it
transpired, the court refused to allow administrators to
recover company property in the hands of hauliers until a
lien in favour of those same hauliers for unpaid carriage
costs had been discharged.
We could also note section 233 of the Act, which
prevents monopoly utility suppliers from withholding
essential supplies to office holders unless they settle pre
appointment arrears.
The pursuit of recovery claims (wrongful trading,
misfeasance or avoidance claims) is dependent upon
available litigation finance. The threat posed by the Legal
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to
the use of conditional fee agreements and after the event
insurance in this context has been successfully resisted by
the insolvency profession via concessions granted in
respect of the application of the provisions in sections 44
and 46 of the 2012 Act, But these concessions are only
temporary and are due to expire in April 2015. For further
information see Ministerial Statement of Jonathan
Djanogly on behalf of the Ministry of Justice dated May 24,
2012.
DUTIES OF INSOLVENCY PRACTITIONERS
These are mainly contained in the common law or
through the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, though
general legislation can impose particular responsibilities
(for example, with regard to the safeguarding of employee
rights, promoting environmental protection and the
prevention of money laundering). Insolvency practitioners
are not subject to the duty to have regard to stakeholders
created by section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, but in
reality that matters little in the light of these discrete and
significant legal responsibilities. Taking an overview of the
responsibilities of insolvency office holders one is tempted
to observe there is a need to develop a core statutory code
along the lines of that applied to company directors by
sections 170–177 of the Companies Act 2006.
A fundamental obligation of stewardship is that of
competence. For some insolvency practitioners this
obligation has been developed through court decision. We
can now assume, in spite of Downsview Nominees v First City
Corporation [1993] AC 295, that receivers owe a duty not
merely to act in good faith but also to take reasonable care.
This more onerous standard was confirmed by the Court of
Appeal in Medforth v Blake [2000] Ch 86. The precise
relationship between these two authorities and the scope of
this duty may not always be entirely clear cut, but there is4
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an illuminating discussion in the judgment of Edward
Bartley Jones QC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High
Court) in International Leisure Ltd v First National Trustee Co Ltd
[2012] EWHC 1971 (Ch), [2012] BCC 738. For other
insolvency practitioners, such as administrators, standards
of competence/efficiency are written into the statutory
matrix under which they operate – so for administrators we
note the terms of Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1,
paragraph 4. More recently, in McAteer v Lismore [2012]
NICh 7, [2012] BPIR 812 it was held by Deeny J that
trustees in bankruptcy owe a duty to take reasonable care
to obtain the best possible price in realising assets included
in the estate. The overall trend here is clear, and, it is
submitted, entirely consistent with the expectations of
professionalism. Any attempt to undermine this
development or to curb duties of competence would not be
in the long term interests of the insolvency profession.
Insolvency practitioners are under a range of positive
obligations. So they are obliged to take control of the
company’s assets – Insolvency Act 1986 section 144.
There is according to Pulsford v Devenish [1903] 2 Ch 625 a
proactive duty to contact known creditors, and they must
ensure that preferential claims are met out of floating
charge realisations. A similar distributional obligation now
operates in respect of the claims of unsecured creditors to
be paid from the reserved fund (or prescribed part)
established by section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986. An
office holder wishing to disapply this obligation (where, for
example, it might be uneconomical to operate it) should
seek the permission of the court (see s 176A(5)).
We have noted above that many insolvency office holders
are treated in law as officers of the court; this confers
protection upon them, but also results in the imposition of
peculiar responsibilities. For example, the duty to act
honourably, as prescribed by the 19th century ruling in Ex
parte James (1874) LR 9 Ch App 609. In modern times this
duty has lost much of its value and is increasingly
subordinated to the obligation to realise assets in the
interest of the legitimate stakeholders. The Wedgwood
Museum Trust case [2011] EWHC 3782 (Ch), where the
pressing need to meet legitimate creditor claims out of
what were found to be the company’s assets trumped the
desirability of protecting the national heritage in ceramics,
attested to this reality without the court having specifically
to address the ex parte James (supra) point. In later
proceedings in this case reported in [2012] EWHC 1974
(Ch) HHJ Purle QC stressed the need for the exercise of
economy on the part of an insolvency office holder in
engaging legal representation. The duty to act honourably
is but part of the package of responsibilities that flows from
being an officer of the court. Witness here the cautionary
observations of Lord Hodge made in the Court of Session
(Outer House) in Re Quantum Distribution (UK) Ltd [2012]
CSOH 191 on 18 December 2012.
The seven recognised professional bodies, in association
with the competent authorities, have for the past two
decades formulated Statements of Insolvency Practice
(“SIPs”). These seek both to inform insolvency practitioners
and to highlight good practice. In some aspects of insolvency
practitioner work their observance is particularly important.
Witness SIP 16 (first issued in 2009) and the use by
administrators of the “prepack” procedure where,
increasingly, judicial approval is contingent upon
compliance with SIP 16 – see for example Re Kayley Vending
Ltd [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] BCC 578, Re Halliwells
LLP [2010] EWHC 2036 (Ch), [2011] BCC 57 and Re
European Directories (DH6) BV [2010] EWHC 3472 (Ch),
[2012] BCC 46. The Insolvency Service has invested
considerable time in monitoring on a six monthly basis
compliance with this standard. Improved compliance rates
have both forestalled threatened legislation and, to some
extent, allayed public concern. But compliance with SIP 16
is no guarantee of judicial backing for a proposed prepack,
as HHJ Purle QC observed in Re UK Steelfixers Ltd [2012]
EWHC 2432 (Ch), [2012] BCC 751.
Insolvency practitioners, by virtue of their membership
of professional associations, are committed to observe
professional codes of ethics. It is often assumed that these
lack teeth – but this is a misconception, partly fuelled by a
lack of public awareness as to how the system works. The
Insolvency Service publishes an Annual Review of Insolvency
Practitioner Regulation detailing the sanctions visited against
errant office holders. These range from cautions to the
imposition of financial penalties. Ultimately, the Insolvency
Service can disqualify an insolvency practitioner from
holding office by withdrawing a licence. The Insolvency
Practitioners Tribunal can deal with disputes over licensing,
but apparently cases coming before it are very rare
occurrences.
The director disqualification regime ironically may also
be deployed against an errant insolvency practitioner – for
discussion of the possibilities here in relation to s. 4 of the
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 see the
judgment of Newey J in Wood v Mistry [2012] EWHC 1899
(Ch).
REVIEWING THE EXERCISE OF POWERS
Once a company has become insolvent and has been
handed over to an office holder, the ability of shareholders
to restrain management is eclipsed. As their tangible
interest in the company has gone, so their corresponding
rights are largely diluted. But insolvency office holders
(particularly those classed as officers of the court) do not
operate in English without any form of supervision. They
can be called to account via a variety of mechanisms. So,
for example, there are procedures under which dissatisfied
interest parties can complain to the court – Insolvency Act
1986 sections 7(3), 167(3) and 168(5) and Sched B1 para
74. A liquidator may be subject to a misfeasance claim
under section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 – Re
Centralcrest Ltd [2000] BCC 727. A comparable example of
this form of accountability in the case of administrators is 5
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provided by paragraph 75 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency
Act 1986.
Very often when the exercise of powers is challenged in
court the office holder can seek solace in the Wednesbury
test (Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury
Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). The courts traditionally have
been disinclined to intervene with a matter of professional
judgement unless Wednesbury unreasonableness is
established. But in Bramston v Haut [2012] EWHC 1279
(Ch) (a case on personal insolvency) Arnold J at first
instance argued that the Wednesbury test is now viewed as a
flexible standard and that each case does turn on its own
individual facts – see paragraph [42]. This might have
suggested that a more interventionist style could be
adopted for the future when reviewing the conduct of
insolvency practitioners. However, on appeal, the Court of
Appeal ([2012] EWCA Civ 1637) reverted to the more
orthodox analysis and concluded in its judgment of
December 14, 2012 that the court should only interfere
with decisions of insolvency practitioners if they can truly




Insolvency practitioners have a legitimate expectation
that they will be paid for their work and that their out of
pocket expenses will be met. As ever, this is a contentious
issue because this prioritised claim may have the effect of
further marginalising unsecured creditors. In the aftermath
of the Maxwell affair (where, incidentally, the costs of the
insolvency process were largely upheld on review – see
[1999] BCC 684) we saw in December 2002 the revision
of Statement of Insolvency Practice 9 This was then
followed by the 2004 Practice Direction of Chief Registrar
Baister on the Remuneration of Court Appointees [2004] BCC
912, the provisions of which were then reproduced in
2012 as Part Five of the Practice Direction: Insolvency
Proceedings (reported in [2012] BCC 409). Transparency
and value for money became the critical factors. The
importance of adherence to this standard was confirmed
by the Court of Appeal in Brook v Reed [2011] EWCA Civ
331, [2012] 1 WLR 419. Further pro transparency
measures were enacted through the Insolvency
(Amendment) Rules 2005 (SI 2005/512) with the
introduction of Regulation 36A into the Insolvency
Regulations 1994 (SI 1994/2507). When applying these
rules the courts do recognise that particularly difficult
cases may be more expensive to resolve – Re Super Aguri Ltd
[2011] BCC 452. In spite of these positive moves, there is
still public concern expressed about the cost of the
insolvency process, though, as we note below, this concern
often misses the point.
As far as administrators are concerned, we note the
Schedule B1 paragraph 99 charge which is designed to
protect their claim for fees earned and expenses incurred.
In Re MK Airlines Ltd [2012] EWHC 1018 (Ch) Morritt C
observed (at para [26]) that the para 99 charge can be
enforced by appointment of a receiver. The Chancellor also
offered important guidance on the pool of assets covered
by the paragraph 99 charge. It remains to be seen if
administrators will use this strategy when claiming their
due from successor office holders.
The question of insolvency expenses is addressed by
legislation in some detail and it is clear from Re Toshoku
Finance UK plc [2002] UKHL 6, [2002] 1 WLR 671 that
the courts are under an injunction to maintain the stated
legislative priorities. That might suggest a degree of
certainty, however, the treatment of administration
expenses is the subject of much discussion at present as we
await the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the appeal
in Bloom v Pensions Regulator [2011] EWCA Civ 1124,
[2012] BCC 83. A useful indicator of the complexity of the
law on insolvency expenses can be gleaned from a perusal
of the impressive judgment of Morgan J in Neumans LLP v
Andronikou [2012] EWHC 3088 (Ch), where the




Any properly instituted stewardship regime must admit
the possibility of misbehaviour/ disputation between the
office holder and stakeholders and must therefore make
available effective removal procedures. Insolvency office
holders cannot be removed at the whim of their
appointors. This security of tenure applies even to
administrative receivers, as is confirmed by section 45(1)
of the Insolvency Act 1986 and considered in Re A & C
Supplies Ltd [1998] BPIR 303. This reflects the importance
of the office held.
In the case of insolvency office holders, we should note
that proof of misbehaviour is not seen as a prerequisite for
removal. The critical issue is one of confidence, or the loss
of it. That said, the courts are reluctant to order removal.
There are two primary reasons for this. First of all, as
intimated above, the courts respect the professional
judgment of insolvency practitioners and are aware that
their (proper) actions may arouse hostility. There is also
the disruption cost associated with any change of office
holder. So in Finnerty v Clark [2011] EWCA Civ 858, [2011]
BCC 702 the Court of Appeal (upholding a judgment of
Morritt C) refused to remove administrators who had
declined to undertake a speculative claim based on section
244 of the Insolvency Act 1986, even though they were
being offered a protective indemnity against costs. The
professional judgement of the administrators deserved
respect. Again, in Re Kimberley Scott Services Ltd [2011]
EWHC 1563 (Ch), [2012] BPIR 135 Norris J rejected an
application to remove liquidators and placed great
emphasis upon the potential disruption that would be
generated by a change of stewardship. For later
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proceedings before Norris J on the issue of the costs of this
removal application see [2011] EWHC 3865 (Ch), [2012]
BPIR 341. A similar supportive attitude manifested itself in
the judgment of Mrs Justice Proudman in Doffman and
Isaacs v Wood and Hellard [2011] EWHC 4008 (Ch), [2012]
BPIR 972 where an application to remove trustees in
bankruptcy was dismissed, but on specified terms.
REFORM AND POLICY ISSUES: FUTURE
DEVELOPMENTS?
Those responsible for the development of English law
(and the insolvency profession itself) can congratulate
themselves on the steps they have taken to improve
standards of stewardship in terms of the role played by
insolvency office holders. The World Bank Doing Business
survey in 2012 also gives the UK a high rating for the
effectiveness its insolvency regime in resolving cases
efficiently. Apparently, the UK is the sixth most highly rated
jurisdiction for the efficiency of its insolvency regime; the
only other aspect of UK business regulation that receives a
better rating is its system of offering credit. But in an
increasingly competitive world, it is never a good idea to
rest on one’s laurels.
There are a number of issues that could be the subject
of constructive reflection.
Firstly, what relevance does the gender debate, that is
currently the subject of media and policymaker attention
with regard to the composition of boards of company
directors, have in the context of the current profile of
insolvency office holders? The key stakeholders in the
profession should certainly have this question under
review.
Should there be further steps taken to coordinate the
handling of complaints against office holders? Is it time to
revisit the Cork Committee’s idea of establishing an
Insolvency Ombudsman (1982, Cmnd 8558 para 1772)?
The profession has in the past appeared to be in two minds
on the merits of such a move and, in fairness, there is little
to suggest that the current system is failing, but public
perceptions do matter and other professions have moved in
this direction. The Office of Fair Trading report in June
2010 (The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners,
OFT1245) favoured moves in this direction with the
setting up of an independent complaints body (see paras
1.26–1.29), but it appeared as a result of the Insolvency
Service Consultation on Reforms to the Regulation of Insolvency
Practitioners, which was published on December 20, 2011
(at pp 7–9), that there was a lack of consensus on the form
and financing of any independent complaints mechanism.
The latest developments here are more encouraging with
the announcement by Business Minister Jo Swinson of the
DBIS on December 20, 2012 that Professor Elaine
Kempson will conduct a review of returns to unsecured
creditors and insolvency practitioner remuneration, with
the results of this review expected to be available in
summer 2013. In the meantime a package of reforms will
be put in place by the regulators and the Insolvency Service
in March which will seek to provide a single gateway for
complaints and greater coordination on the application of
sanctions against those insolvency practitioners who are
found to fall short of required standards. Improved
transparency will also be introduced to reassure the public
of the seriousness with which complaints are viewed by the
regulatory authorities.
Should we move away from the idea of appointment of
insolvency office holders in personam to a recognition
of corporate office holders? This would avoid many of the
problems that can arise with regard to block transfers
of office, but would this undermine standards of
professionalism? The debate is finely balanced here.
Can we develop more efficient procedures to clarify the
law as practised by insolvency office holders? Admittedly,
all office holders have access to a directions facility, but this
is subject to the vagaries of our judicial system. Directions
given by first instance judges can be contradictory (witness
the para 22 administration saga and the related matters
concerned with the potential of Insolvency Rule 7.55 to
whitewash procedural irregularities). Uncertainty as to the
current law introduces inefficiencies into the insolvency
procedure (by requiring applications to court for
directions) and causes much concern for practitioners.
“Defensive” applications to the court by insolvency
practitioners to clarify potential uncertainties are a fact of
life and are entirely understandable. More generally the
adoption of some form of “prospective overruling” may be
a possibility worth evaluating as this would remove some of
the concerns of insolvency practitioners that a later court
ruling in relation to an insolvency might expose them to
historic liability in a case that has already been processed.
Unfortunately, the English courts have refused to go down
this road in the past, and the policymakers have preferred
instead to allay the concerns of practitioners via
retrospective legislation (witness the Insolvency Act 1994)
or extra statutory concessions in the form of “Crown
Statements” (used in the wake of Leyland DAF [2004]
UKHL 9 and Nat West Bank v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005]
UKHL 41), but this is a problem that will not go away.
It may well be that a number of these issues are being
looked at, and it may well be that any such reviews would
favour the status quo. Provided such reflection is
happening, we can be reassured. At the last reading there
was nothing in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill
2012 to indicate imminent reform in the aforementioned
elements of insolvency practitioner regulation, though
there has been pressure from the profession to extend to
ambit of section 233 to a wider range of suppliers so as to
falcate turnaround opportunities. As commentators on this
Bill we must remain alert to new clauses being tabled.
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OVERVIEW
We have in the UK an effective system for the regulation
of insolvency practitioners and in global terms it is highly
regarded. It is now heavily regulated and it will be
interesting to see if the Cabinet Office’s “Red Tape
Challenge”, which was applied to insolvency practice in
September 2012, comes up with any suggestions for
deregulation. Unfortunately, our system often means that
unsecured creditors gain little when an insolvent
company’s assets are distributed and insolvency
practitioners (who, of course, have to break the bad news
to creditors) are invariably held to blame, with the finger
being pointed at their apparently high professional costs.
This partial perspective (which appeals to politicians of all
shades) is unfair if viewed in isolation. Insolvency
practitioners are highly professional people who draw upon
the services of other highly qualified professionals to
facilitate the discharge of their onerous responsibilities.
They have a reasonable expectation to be paid at an
appropriate rate and to have their expenses met. Equally if
they fall short of the required standards of stewardship they
should expect sanctions to be visited upon them. If there
are problems and consequential costs in the system of
clearing up the mess when a limited liability company fails
many of them relate to the “front end” of the process in
which limited liability is made available to all and sundry
with few safeguards being put in place.
There is also the fact that our “love affair” with the
institution of security means that notwithstanding the best
efforts of insolvency office holders there are few residual
assets to distribute to unsecured creditors, even after the
reserved fund has been utilised for their benefit. If we wish
to improve the operation of the law relating to insolvent
companies and to make life more palatable to unsecured
creditors it is to these fundamental aspects that serious
thought should also be given.
• This is a revised and updated version of a paper
delivered by Professor Milman at the Institute of
Advanced Legal Studies on November 29, 2012. His
forthcoming monograph, The Governance of
Distressed Firms, will be published by Edward Elgar
later this year.
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